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EUTHANASIA CONSIDERED: PROFESSIONAL PATERNALISM OR
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM? EUTHANASIA: THE MORAL ISSUES. Edited by
Robert M. Baird and Stuart E. Rosenbaum. Buffalo: Prometheus Books.
1989. Pp. 182. $13.95.
Reviewed by Michael S. Jacobs*
The relatively recent capability of medical technology to prolong human ex-
istence has posed a battery of difficult questions for society, ethicists, doctors,
and lawyers. These questions are made even more difficult by the profound
changes that have recently occurred both in the law and in medicine. For ex-
ample, only nineteen years have passed since the first clear judicial recognition
of the importance of informed consent as a precondition of medical treatment,1
only twenty-four years since the first successful human heart transplant,2 and
only twenty-six years since the establishment of the federal Medicare' and
Medicaid" programs.
One of the most troublesome of the new order of problems posed by the
development of life-prolonging medical technology is whether individuals moti-
vated only by humane concerns may ethically and lawfully permit, or even
help to bring about, the death of one who is suffering greatly. We wonder, in
other words, whether euthanasia is a moral and/or legal act.
"Euthanasia," a word derived from the combination of the Greek words eu
("good" or "easy") and thanatos ("death"), literally means "easy death."' 5 In
* Assistant Professor, DePaul University College of Law; B.A., 1968, Dartmouth College; J.D.,
1971, Yale University; M.P.H., 1987, Johns Hopkins University.
1. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d
229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514-(1972).
2. On December 3, 1967, in Capetown, South Africa, Dr. Christiaan Barnard performed the
first human heart transplant on Louis Washkansky, a 55-year-old grocer. Altman, 4,000 in U.S.
Now Live with Another's Heart, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1987, at C3, col. 1. Mr. Washkansky sur-
vived for 18 days. Id. In 1987, the New York Times reported that an estimated 4000 Americans
were living with someone else's heart and that surgeons were performing heart transplants in 95
American medical centers at an estimated rate of. 1600 to 1800 per year. Id. As of that time, the
longest living survivor of a heart transplant was Emmanuel Vitria of Marseilles, France, who lived
for 18 '/ years after his operation. Id.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ccc (1988) (Medicare portion of the Social Security Act).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396s (1988) (Medicaid portion of the Social Security Act).
5. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 469 (3d ed. 1988); Koop, The Right to Die: The
Moral Dilemma, in EUTHANASIA: THE MORAL ISSUES 69 (R. Baird & S. Rosenbaum eds. 1989).
Webster's dictionary defines euthanasia as "an easy and painless death" or "an act or method of
causing death painlessly, so as to end suffering: advocated by some as a way to deal with persons
dying of incurable, painful diseases." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, supra. at 469. The
Euthanasia Society of America defines the term as "the termination of life by painless means for
the purpose of ending severe physical suffering." Koop, supra, at 69.
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general, advocates of euthanasia believe that for some terminally ill people,
life holds so much pain and so little pleasure that an easy death-caused per-
haps by an intentional overdose of barbiturates'-is clearly preferable to a
prolonged and agonizing end of life.7 Opponents of euthanasia seem to fall
broadly into two camps. Some believe that life is sacred and should be ended
only by an act of divine providence, never by one of human will.' Others
claim, in more secular fashion, that if euthanasia were permitted, it could
never be adequately controlled. 9 Given our inability to eliminate conflicts of
interest (between or among family members, medical personnel, and the pa-
tient) or to define fairly the critical terms (such as "terminally ill," "so much
pain," or "so little pleasure"), we would cheapen human life by arrogating to
ourselves the undefined power to end it.lo
Two important distinctions are relevant to the euthanasia debate. The first
is between active and passive euthanasia-that is, the distinction between
overtly killing on the one hand, and permitting death on the other. 1 As the
term implies, active euthanasia involves an explicit act, such as the injection of
a lethal dose of a drug, on the part of someone-a physician for exam-
ple-that leads directly to the patient's death.12 Passive euthanasia occurs
6. See Admiraal, Justifiable Active Euthanasia in the Netherlands, in EUTHANASIA: THE
MORAL ISSUES 127 (R. Baird & S. Rosenbaum eds. 1989) (describing the Dutch practice of using
a combination of barbiturate and curare to hasten death).
7. E.g., Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA: THE MORAL ISSUES 46 (R.
Baird & S. Rosenbaum eds. 1989); Vaux, Debbie's Dying: Mercy Killing and the Good Death, in
EUTHANASIA: THE MORAL ISSUES 30 (R. Baird & S. Rosenbaum eds. 1989).
8. E.g., Koop, The Case of Karen Quinlan, in EUTHANASIA: THE MORAL ISSUES 42 (R. Baird
& S. Rosenbaum eds. 1989).
9. E.g., Gay-Williams, The Wrongfulness of Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA: THE MORAL ISSUES
101 (R. Baird & S. Rosenbaum eds. 1989); Shewmon, Active Voluntary Euthanasia: A Needless
Pandora's Box, in EUTHANASIA: THE MORAL ISSUES 130 (R. Baird & S. Rosenbaum eds. 1989)
("[T]his particular 'slippery slope' is not merely a theoretical possibility; it is a present reality.").
10. E.g., Gay-Williams, supra note 9, at 101 (Euthanasia "could have a corrupting influence so
that in any case that is severe doctors and nurses might not try hard enough to save the patient.").
11. EUTHANASIA: THE MORAL ISSUES 10 (R. Baird & S. Rosenbaum eds. 1989) (editors'
introduction).
12. Id. This distinction has been set forth by the Judicial Council of the American Medical
Association ("AMA") in its Report on the Physician and the Dying Patient, a report accepted by
the AMA at its Clinical Convention in December, 1973. The relevant section of the report states:
The intentional termination of the life of one human being by another-mercy kill-
ing-is contrary to that for which the medical profession stands and is contrary to the
policy of the American Medical Association.
The cessation of the employment of extraordinary means to prolong the life of the
body when there is irrefutable evidence that biological death is imminent is the deci-
sion of the patient and/or his immediate family. The advice and judgment of the
physician should be freely available to the patient and/or his immediate family.
AMA Grams, 227 J. A.M.A. 728, 728 (1974) (quoting JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, REPORT ON THE PHYSICIAN AND THE DYING PATIENT (1973)).
Some have criticized this distinction between active and passive euthanasia. See Rachels, supra
note 7, passim (arguing that active euthanasia should be treated the same as passive euthanasia
because allowing someone to die is just as bad-and sometimes more painful-than overtly killing
[Vol. 40:925
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where the care giver deliberately fails to take steps that are necessary to pro-
long life, such as by failing to resuscitate a patient whose heart has stopped
beating."3
The second distinction is between voluntary and involuntary euthanasia.
Logically enough, voluntary euthanasia occurs when the patient explicitly con-
sents to his or her death. 4 On the other hand, involuntary euthanasia occurs
when someone other than the patient makes the decision about the patient's
death.15 Thus, allowing a comatose patient to die would be involuntary eutha-
nasia unless, before he had become comatose and while still competent, that
patient had made it clear that he wished to die should he ever fall into a
permanent coma.
Surprisingly, perhaps, a significant percentage of Americans seems to favor
active, voluntary euthanasia for the terminally ill." In March of 1988, the
Roper Organization asked almost two thousand people whether a physician
should lawfully be able to end the life of a terminally ill patient who requests
it. 17 Fifty-eight percent of those polled answered affirmatively, while only
twenty-seven percent were opposed to the idea (with fourteen percent unde-
cided).1 8 The same question put to a similar group by Roper in 1986 yielded
almost the same set of responses: sixty-two percent in favor, twenty-seven per-
cent against, and ten percent undecided.19 The results of these polls seem even
more remarkable in light of the fact that the question asked by Roper did not
describe the hypothetical terminally ill patient either as suffering or as being
in great pain.20
Perhaps the findings of the Roper Organization are not so surprising as they
might appear. Roper's poll failed to provide its subjects with definitions of the
words "terminally ill," "end the life," or "requests," thereby avoiding all of
the thorny terminological problems that cause a good portion of the euthana-
sia debate. Moreover, there are much more difficult questions that can be
him).
13. EUTHANASIA: THE MORAL ISSUES, supra note 11, at 10.
14. Id. at II.
15. Id.
16. 70% in Study Would Halt Life-Support if Terminal, Chicago Sun-Times, March 28, 1991,
at 6, col. 2 (reporting that doctors at two Boston hospitals found that 70% of the people surveyed
would decide against life-sustaining treatment if they were "gravely ill and incompetent to speak
for themselves").
17. ROPER ORGANIZATION, THE 1988 ROPER POLL ON VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA 1 (1988)
(copy on file in the offices of the DePaul Law Review).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. The Roper Organization asked:
Question: There is a great deal of discussion these days about the conflict between a
doctor's moral obligation to a terminally-ill patient and the doctor's responsibility
under the law. When a person has a painful and distressing terminal disease, do you
think doctors should or should not be allowed by law to end the patient's life if there
is no hope of recovery and the patient requests it?
Id. (emphasis omitted).
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asked about euthanasia than the question posed by Roper; questions that
might perplex society every bit as much as they vex the doctors, lawyers, and
ethicists who are increasingly required to find answers for them."'
How, for example, should a physician respond to a competent patient who,
though severely and permanently disabled and in great and continuous pain, is
not "terminally ill" but, nevertheless, requests the physician's assistance in
ending his life? What should be done when one person requests physician as-
sistance in ending the life of another person who is terminally ill but incompe-
tent, such that his wishes about euthanasia were either not made known at all
or were voiced only vaguely or ambiguously? What is the ethical response to
the request of a parent who asks that certain lifesaving surgery not be per-
formed on his newborn child, who will certainly die without the surgery, but
whose physical and mental condition, even with successful surgery, will always
be drastically compromised?
These are some of the difficult questions dealt with in Euthanasia: The
Moral Issues.22 In nineteen separate essays, a distinguished assortment of phy-
sicians and philosophers provides a relatively broad perspective on cross-cul-
tural approaches to euthanasia,23 and on the utility of drawing distinctions
between active and passive euthanasia on the one hand,2 and between volun-
tary and involuntary euthanasia on the other."' These essays also focus on the
moral differences between euthanasia for the adult patient and euthanasia for
the infant or child. 6 Most of the essays are thoughtful, cogently argued, and
21. See Koop, supra note 5, at 70 (posing some perplexing questions now at issue in the eutha-
nasia debate).
22. EUTHANASIA: THE MORAL ISSUES (R. Baird & S. Rosenbaum eds. 1989).
23. One of the essays, Justifiable Active Euthanasia in the Netherlands, by Pi*eter Admiraal, a
Dutch physician, describes the practice in Holland of using a combination of barbiturate and
curare to hasten the deaths of patients "who are in the terminal phase of an incurable, usually
terminal disease." Admiraal, supra note 6, at 127. This practice is widely accepted in Hol-
land-5000 patients per year are helped to die in this fashion-but it is not legal. An informal
agreement has developed between Dutch prosecutors and the medical community that no prosecu-
tions will be brought so long as certain defined guidelines have been followed by the physicians.
Id. at 125.
Another essay, Conclusions of a British Medical Association Review of Guidelines on Eutha-
nasia, sets forth in detail the position of the British Medical Association ("BMA"), the British
analogue to the AMA, opposing euthanasia. The AMA's formal position, opposing active euthana-
sia, is described at several points in the book. E.g., EUTHANASIA: THE MORAL ISSUES, supra note
I1, at 11.
24. The editors' introduction to the essays describes the difference between active and passive
euthanasia as the difference "between overtly killing and 'letting die.' " EUTHANASIA: THE MORAL
ISSUES, supra note 11, at 10. In more practical terms, the difference might be described as that
between administering a fatal overdose to one terminally ill patient and deciding not to resuscitate
another.
25. The editors characterize voluntary euthanasia as involving "explicit consent by the patient"
and involuntary euthanasia as involving "a decision for death by a person or persons other than
the patient." Id. at 11.
26. See Englehardt, Ethical Issues in Aiding the Death of Young Children, in EUTHANASIA:
THE MORAL ISSUES 141 (R. Baird & S. Rosenbaum eds. 1989).
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useful in outlining the large moral dilemmas inherent in the euthanasia
debate."
The book suffers, however, from its almost exclusive focus on the physician's
perspective about the crucial moral dilemmas and from its complete lack of
attention to the legal system's responses to them. 8 A-comparison of the legal
and medical perspectives would not only have been useful, but philosophically
instructive as well. Thus, while many physicians no doubt recognize, and act
upon, the importance of patient autonomy, the profession itself and many indi-
vidual physicians believe strongly in the value of a paternalistic beneficence
that periodically argues in favor of overriding the wishes of even the compe-
tent patient when medical treatment not desired by that patient could provide
him with some distinct physical benefit 2 '
27. The unfortunate exceptions to this standard are the two essays written by C. Everett Koop,
the former Surgeon General of the United States. The first Koop essay, The Case of Karen Quin-
lan, was itself taken from a book by Dr. Koop written in 1976. See C. KooP, THE RIGHT TO LIVE:
THE RIGHT TO DIE 102-11 (1976). Using Koop's intensely personal and Christian view of life as
its major point of reference, the essay praises the Superior Court's decision in In re Quinlan, 137
N.J. Super. 227, 348 A.2d 801 (1975), modified, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S.
922 (1976), denying the Quinlans' request to have Karen removed from her respirator. Koop,
supra note 8, at 39. Koop's level of legal discourse was not only very unsophisticated but also was
almost immediately outdated; on March 31, 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court modified the
Superior Court in the landmark case of In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 55, 355 A.2d 647, 671-72, cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
Koop's second essay, The Right to Die: The Moral Dilemmas, also taken from his book, argues
in part that the moral dilemmas are amenable to religious solutions. Koop, supra note 5, at 80.
Such an argument largely forecloses further debate, especially among those who do not share Dr.
Koop's convictions.
28. In their introduction to the book, the editors pay lip service to the importance of the law in
the larger debate about euthanasia. EUTHANASIA: THE MORAL ISSUES, supra note 11, at 10 ("law
and morality are so intertwined . . . [that] [t]he legal issue . . . is never far in the background").
But with the exception of Dr. Koop's tortured interpretation of the Quinlan case, none of the
essayists attempt to deal seriously with any of the important legal questions.
29. Koop, supra note 5, at 73; Duffy, Makovsky, Roberts, Sheets, Yalowitz, Cumming-Bruce,
Sheler & Boroughs, A Very Chilling Bedside Manner, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 18, 1990,
at 10, 10.
The recent dismissal of first degree murder charges against Dr. Jack Kevorkian, whose make-
shift "suicide machine" was used by Janet Adkins to end her life, dramatically highlighted some
of the profound ethical tensions raised for the medical profession by the issue of assisted suicide,
which is perhaps the most extreme recognition of patient autonomy. See Wilkerson, Prosecutors
Seek to Ban Doctor's Suicide Device, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1991, § 1, at 6, col. 5. Mrs. Adkins
suffered from Alzheimer's Disease, but, according to her personal physician, she was in a rela-
tively early stage of the disease process, L.A. Times, Jan. 5, 1991, part A, at 26, col. 3, was
physically fit and in good spirits, Wilkerson, supra, at 6, col. 5, and could have lived another seven
to ten years if she had not taken her own life. L.A. Times, supra, at 26, col. 3. Her personal
physician was convinced that because of her disease, Mrs. Adkins was not competent to choose
suicide; he also believed that she was not terminally ill. Wilkerson, supra, at 6, col. 5. To Dr.
Kevorkian and others, however, Mrs. Adkins was indeed competent. She had tried and rejected
experimental drug treatment for her disease, was aware that the disease was progressing; and
knew that she faced a future of severe dementia and disorientation. For her, Dr. Kevorkian's
machine was a means to achieve the painless death that she sought. Id.
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By contrast, the approach of the legal system has been decidedly more con-
cerned with patient autonomy. It is clear, for example, from a growing and
definitive body of case law, that competent persons have the right to refuse
treatment initially, discontinue treatment already undertaken, and decline
even lifesaving treatment."0 These cases, while satisfactory in dealing with the
rights of competent patients, do not provide adequate answers to the questions
pertaining to incompetents. From the legal perspective, these are currently the
most troubling questions. Who, if anyone, should be allowed to speak for the
incompetent patient? What should be done when family members, usually the
surrogate of first resort for the incompetent, disagree about whether, or how
much, to treat the patient? What evidence, if any, of the patient's
wishes---expressed during an earlier, competent time-should be heard? Is
there any person or institution sufficiently free from conflicts of interest to
whom the law can comfortably look for an objective opinion about prolonging
an incompetent's life?81
Especially with respect to this last question, few doctors appear to realize
the conflicts inherent in their professional role. Doctors are taught to save
lives, not to end them; they are instructed in the benefits of using new technol-
ogy, not in the benefits of forgoing its use; and they are encouraged by society
30. Last Term, the Supreme Court decided Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110
S. Ct. 2841 (1990), a case involving the constitutionality of a Missouri statute requiring a surro-
gate seeking to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from his terminally ill and incompetent ward to
prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that the ward, if competent, would have agreed with
that decision. Id. Before ruling on the incompetent person's rights, the Court recognized that
"[tihe principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refus-
ing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions." Id. at 2851 (emphasis
added); accord Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300-
01 (1986); Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 193-94, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 224
(1984); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 430, 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (1986);
In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 347, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (1985); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 377,
420 N.E.2d 64, 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 273 (1981).
In theory, the right of a competent person to refuse medical treatment is not absolute. In Super-
intendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977), the
Massachusetts Supreme Court identified four "countervailing State interests" that could overcome
a patient's choice: "(1) the preservation of life; (2) the protection of the interests of innocent third
parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; and (4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical
profession." Id. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425. Saikewicz himself was an incompetent, mentally re-
tarded patient, but those four interests have been mentioned in other cases involving competent
patients, although in none of these cases have they been found sufficient to overcome the choice of
a competent patient. E.g., Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1142, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304; Bartling, 163
Cal. App. 3d at 193-94, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
31. Although the answers to these questions are not always clear, certain general principles
have started to emerge. In the past five years, for example, a growing number of state and federal
courts have permitted, or have announced that they would permit, the withdrawal of artificial
nutrition and hydration from incompetent patients. See Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 589-90
(D.R.I. 1988); Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368, 371-72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); In re
Estate of Longeway, 133 111. 2d 33, 46, 549 N.E.2d 292, 298 (1989); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d
947, 952 (Me. 1987); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 441, 497 N.E.2d 626,
639-40 (1986); In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 556, 747 P.2d 445, 451 (1987).
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to make decisions for others, not necessarily to involve them in the process of
medical decisionmaking. The philosophers and doctors whose essays appear in
Euthanasia largely 32 reflect this parochial view of physician power and respon-
sibility."3 Their collective wonder and dismay at what they consider to be the
overinvolvement of "the courts" in issues that, to them, are strictly medical in
nature.4 reflect the absence of an understanding on their part-and on the
part of the editors as well-that neither society in general, nor the law in
particular, regards doctors with the same untroubled neutrality that doctors
ascribe to themselves.3 5
By failing to challenge adequately the physicians' notion that they are the
best and the most objective decisionmakers for the incompetent terminally ill,
the book fails to offer a balanced presentation of one of the most important
areas of the euthanasia debate. The moral issues surrounding euthanasia are
no longer the exclusive province of the medical profession. Legal, consumerist,
and social perspectives also inform the euthanasia debate. A book that fails to
include these perspectives provides its readers with a picture of that debate
that is both skewed and incomplete.
32. Some exceptions do exist. E.g., Englehardt, supra note 26; Rachels, supra nofe 7; Rachels,
More Important Distinctions in EUTHANASIA: THE MORAL ISSUES (R. Baird & S. Rosenbaum eds.
1989).
33. E.g., Koop, supra note 5, at 75, 82.
34. E.g.. id. at 82 ("The medical profession has been disappointingly silent as they have heard
the intellectual arguments, Supreme Court rulings, and population-concern pressures that have
begun to alter the fundamental basis which has for so long set them apart as the proponents of the
healing art.").
35. Thus, it appears to be inconceivable to some of the physician essayists, notably Doctors
Koop, Shewmon, Kass and Pellegrino, that anyone other than doctors ought to be actively in-
volved in the debate about euthanasia and it appears equally inconceivable to them that, despite
the increased financial rewards available to doctors who continue treating terminally ill patients,
anyone could properly question the medical profession's neutrality in this debate.
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